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Commercial Law
by Robert A. Weber, Jr.*
Commercial law is "the whole body of substantive jurisprudence ...
applicable to the rights, intercourse, and relations of persons engaged in
commerce, trade, or mercantile pursuits."1 Of course, an article on
commercial law that used this statement to define its coverage would be
completely unsuitable for a survey. The Author instead relied on
Georgia's Commercial Code to determine the body of law to review in
this Article and, accordingly, structured it in a similar fashion.
This Article covers case law and statutory amendments from June 1,
1994, through May 31, 1996. The review of Article 9 caselaw includes
decisions by federal bankruptcy courts in Georgia as well as those
decided by Georgia's state courts. Most notably, however, is what is not
covered by this Article. The Georgia General Assembly recently adopted
complete revisions of Articles 3 and 4. Because of considerations unique
to that massive undertaking, it has been dealt with in a separate article
by Professor Michael Sabbath, who served as the Official Reporter for
the revision's consideration by the General Assembly. In next year's
survey, Articles 3 and 4 will again be dealt with in this Article.
I.

SALES

A.

Scope
Determining the coverage of Article 2 is not merely an academic
endeavor. For example, contracts within the scope of Article 2 are
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subject to a four-year statute of limitations,2 whereas the limitations
period for simple contracts in writing that are not within Article 2 is six
years.' This distinction, and the necessity of conducting a scope inquiry,
was demonstrated by a recent decision of the court of appeals. In
Southern Tank Equipment Co. v. Zartic,4 practitioners were provided
with a definitive test for deciding whether a hybrid contract-one
involving both the sale of goods and the provision of labor-falls within
the scope of Article 2. That test is as follows:
When the predominant element of a contract is the sale of goods, the
contract is viewed as a sales contract and the UCC applies even though
a substantial amount of service is to be rendered in installing the
goods. When, on the other hand, the predominant element of a
contract is the furnishing of services, the contract is viewed as a
service contract and the UCC does not apply. As it is said: A contract
for services and labor with an incidental furnishing of equipment and
materials is not a transaction involving the sale of goods and is not
controlled by the UCC. Factors to be considered in determining the
predominant element of a contract include the proportion of the total
contract cost allocated to the goods and whether the price of the goods
are segregated from the price for services. A smaller proportion of the
total price assignable to services, or a failure to state a separate price
for services rendered, suggest a contract for the sale of goods with
services merely incidental. 5
Applying this test, the court found the transaction in Zartic to be for the
sale of goods.6 Over half of the purchase price was for one piece of
equipment, with the remainder of the purchase price representing goods
and services. In addition, the sale of the piece of equipment was
arranged first, and only thereafter did the parties add the other
materials and service. Accordingly, Article 2's four-year limitations
period applied to preclude plaintiff's recovery.'
Article 2 coverage determines not only the appropriate limitations
period, but also the existence of certain remedies. In Keaton u. A.B.C.
Drug Co.,' plaintiff pulled a bottle of bleach from a top shelf in
defendant's store. The bottle's cap was loose and bleach spilled into
plaintiff's eye when, in the course of removing the bottle from the shelf,

2. O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725 (1994).
3. Id. § 9-3-24 (1996).
4.

221 Ga. App. 503, 471 S.E.2d 587 (1996).

5. Id. at 503-04, 471 S.E.2d at 588 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
6. Id. at 505, 471 S.E.2d at 589.
7. Id.
8. 266 Ga. 385, 467 S.E.2d 558 (1996), rev'g sub nom., A.B.C. Drug Co. v. Monroe, 214
Ga. App. 136, 447 S.E.2d 315 (1994).
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plaintiff tipped the bottle towards her.9 In assessing the validity of
plaintiff's claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,'0
Judge Beasley's concurrence in the court of appeals decision astutely
noted that at the point plaintiff removed the bleach from the shelf, no
"sale" had taken place." Because "the UCC warranties can only be
made by a seller of goods, and those warranties can only be extended
either to the buyer or to those who have a specified relationshipwith the
buyer," Judge Beasley concluded that the warranty provisions of Article
2 did not apply.12 The supreme court disagreed, however, finding that
plaintiff's "actions of grasping the product and beginning to take the
product from the shelf with the intent to purchase it sufficiently
constituted 'possession' of the product, establishing privity between
[plaintiff] and [defendant]."' 3
The disagreement between the supreme court's decision and Judge
Beasley's concurrence centered on the interpretation of an earlier
decision, Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc. 4 The court in Fender analyzed
the facts before it to decide whether there existed, in the terms of Article
2, "a present sale of goods [or] a contract to sell goods at a future
time."" If either existed, Article 2 applied.' The plaintiff in Fender
had "finished her shopping and was in the physical act of placing the
bottles on the [check-out] counter for payment when the explosion
occurred." 7 More importantly, plaintiff said she was at the check-out
counter to pay for her purchases. The court first concluded that "the
retailer's act of placing the bottles on the shelf with the price stamped
upon them manifested an intent to offer them for sale, the terms of the
offer being that it would pass title to the customer when they were
presented at the check-out counter and paid for."'" The court found
that "plaintiff's act of taking physical possession of the goods with the
intent to purchase them manifested an intent to accept the offer and a

9. 266 Ga. at 385, 467 S.E.2d at 560.
10. O.C.G.A. § 11-2-314 (1994).
11. 214 Ga, App. at 141, 447 S.E.2d at 320 (Beasley, P.J., concurring).

12. Id.
13. 266 Ga. at 386, 467 S.E.2d at 561.
14.

138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976).

15. Id. at 32, 225 S.E.2d at 693.
16. Id. Article 2 will imply a warranty "upon a contract for sale and not solely upon

the execution of the sale itself." Id. A "contract for sale" is in turn defined as "both a
present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time .... " Id. (citing
O.C.G.A. § 11-2-106(1)).

17. Id. at 33, 225 S.E.2d at 693.
18. Id.
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promise to take them to the check-out counter and to there pay for
them."19
The supreme court's conclusion that Article 2 applied in A.B.C. Drug
Co. was obviously premised on a finding that plaintiff had the "intent to
purchase" the product when she removed it from the shelf. The supreme
court did not specify what evidence supported a finding that the plaintiff
in A.B.C. Drug Co. "intended to purchase" the bleach when she removed
it from the shelf.20 The opinions only indicate that plaintiff went to
defendant's store to purchase laundry detergent and a half-gallon of
Clorox bleach, that she already had a box of detergent under her arm,
and that she reached above her head to grasp a half-gallon bottle of
bleach.2 1 From these facts one could certainly infer that plaintiff
intended to purchase the bottle of bleach.
The supreme court's decision should have more clearly stressed the
necessity that a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing his or her
"intent to purchase" a product when retrieved from a shelf.22 By failing
to do so, the decision in A.B. C. Drug Co. suggests that every shopper is
a purchaser for purposes of Article 2. If subsequent decisions gloss over
this requirement as the supreme court did in A.B.C. Drug Co., Article 2
will be transformed into a tort statute in the consumer context.
B.

WarrantyActions

1. Express Warranty. Section 11-2-313 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") sets forth the manner in which a seller
may create express warranties, the breach of which may then serve as
the basis for a buyer's cause of action. At times, sellers get ahead of
themselves and use typical sales language, such as, "this is the best
widget on the market," creating an express warranty that they
subsequently regret. Whether such sales talk or "puffing" amounts to an
express warranty is determined as follows:

19. Id., 225 S.E.2d at 693-94.
20. Keaton v. A.B.C. Drug Co., 266 Ga. at 386, 467 S.E.2d at 561.
21. A.B.C. Drug Co. v. Monroe, 214 Ga. App. at 136, 447 S.E.2d at 316.
22. In McQuiston v. K-Mart Corp., 796 F.2d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying
Florida law), the Eleventh Circuit found the requisite intent to purchase absent. "[The

uncontradicted evidence in [plaintiff's] pretrial deposition and trial testimony was that she
was shopping for a cookie jar and had lifted the lid of this jar to see if the price tag was
located inside. She had not formed any intent to purchase." Id. Accordingly, plaintiff had

no Article 2 warranty cause of action. Id. Only by ensuring that a plaintiff proves an
intent to purchase will courts prevent Article 2 from becoming a tort statute in the
consumer context.
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The decisive test, in determining whether language used is a mere
expression of opinion or a warranty, is whether it purported to state a
fact upon which it may fairly be presumed the seller expected the
buyer to rely and upon which a buyer would ordinarily rely. If the
language used is of that character, the fact of reliance on the part of
the buyer and the presumption of intent on the part of the seller which
the law would raise in such a case would operate to create a warranty.
No particular form of words is necessary to constitute a warranty ....
[W]hether the words used amount to a warranty or not, is a question
for the jury, under the rules of law applicable to the case.2"
Applying this test, the court of appeals in Moore v. Berry24 concluded
that a seller's representations that a tree stand was "probably the safest
one on the market" and that "there is no way you can fall" were not
mere sales talk or "puffery" and presented jury questions as to whether
an express warranty to that effect had been created.25 The court also
disagreed with the trial court's assessment that the foregoing statements
were "too vague" to create an express warranty, stating that "if this
constitutes vague language, we can hardly imagine words which would
be deemed specific."26
In some circumstances, even though the existence of an express
warranty is undisputed, the buyer's conduct can preclude his recovery
In Lane v. Corbitt Cypress Co.,27 the court found that the express
warranty given-that roofing shingles sold to plaintiff "were 'tidewater'
cypress roofing shakes, or that they would last 45 years'"-was predicated on the assumption that the shingles would be installed according to
seller's instructions.2" Thus, when the buyer failed to follow the seller's
installation instructions,29he was precluded from recovering on the basis
of the express warranty.
Finally, there is the question of the disclaimer of express warranties.
Although BMW received some assistance this year from the Supreme
Court of the United States,"0 the Georgia Court of Appeals found that
BMW's attempt to use separate provisions within its retail installment

23. Moore v. Berry, 217 Ga. App. 697, 698, 458 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1995) (quoting Bell v.
Menzies, 110 Ga. App. 436, 438, 138 S.E.2d 731, 732 (1964)).
24. 217 Ga. App. 697, 458 S.E.2d 879 (1995).

25. Id. at 698-99, 458 S.E.2d at 881.
26. Id. at 698, 458 S.E.2d at 880.
27. 215 Ga. App. 388, 450 S.E.2d 855 (1994).

28. Id. at 389, 450 S.E.2d at 857.
29. Id.
30. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (finding that a grossly
excessive punitive damage award for selling partially repainted car as "new" violated due
process).
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sales contract to disclaim express warranties also contained therein was
ineffective." The sales contract in question described the car to be sold
as "new;" however, the car's surface had been refinished in places to
repair marring that occurred while in transit The contract also
contained a specific disclaimer of any express or implied warranties by
the seller, and further proclaimed in all capital letters that the car was
"SOLD AS IS.""2 Both disclaimers were ineffective to negate the
express statement that the car was "new."33
2. Implied Warranty. In every contract for the sale of goods,
Article 2 implies a warranty by the seller that the goods are "merchantable," that is, that the goods will at least satisfy the following:
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;
and
(d) Run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) Conform to the promises
or affirmations of fact made on the
34
container or label if any.
When a buyer alleges that the goods are defective because they do not
conform to one or more of the foregoing descriptions, he must prove that
the defect existed at the time of sale.35 Thus, the implied warranty of
merchantability warrants "against defects or conditions existing at the

31. Rivers v. BMW of North America, Inc., 214 Ga. App. 880, 449 S.E.2d 337 (1994).
32. Id. at 880, 449 S.E.2d 338-39.
33. Id. at 885,449 S.E.2d at 341. Although not cited by the court, O.C.G.A. section 112-316(1) specifically addresses disclaimer of express warranties, and states:

Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed whenever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this
article on parol or extrinsic evidence ... negation or limitation is inoperative to

the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
O.C.G.A. § 11-2-316(1) (1994). The court apparently concluded, without so stating, that
these contract terms were incapable of a consistent construction.
34. O.C.G.A. § 11-2-314(2) (1994).

35. Jones v. Marcus, 217 Ga. App. 372, 373, 457 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1995). Until the court
of appeals decided Jones, the question of whether the alleged defect had to exist at the time
of sale had not been addressed in Georgia. Id.
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time of sale, but dolesl not provide a warranty of continuing serviceability." s It is also important to note that the nature of a seller's liability for
breach of the U.C.C.'s implied warranties differs from the strict tort
liability imposed on the manufacturer of defective goods."
In tort-type warranty situations-those in which the goods cause
personal injury to the buyer-the defense most commonly asserted by
sellers is that the defect which resulted in injury to the buyer was: (1)
patent, or (2) latent and was either (a) disclosed to the buyer, or (b)
discoverable by the exercise of caution on the part of the buyer."8 The
seller in Keaton v. A.B.C. Drug Co. was unsuccessful in using this
defense. When the buyer reached for a bottle of bleach located on a top
shelf in seller's store, the bottle tipped and a loose cap allowed bleach to
spill into buyer's eyes. Although the court of appeals had summarily
concluded without any analysis that the defense precluded recovery by
the buyer, the supreme court disagreed, finding that because the top was
not off and that there was nothing noticeably wrong with the bottle,
"there was no patent or obvious defect."3 9 Whether the buyer failed to
exercise caution for her own safety was thus a jury question.4 °
The patent defect defense similarly failed the seller in Moore v.
Berry.4 ' Stating "an implied warranty protects the buyer only against
latent defects which are not discoverable by the exercise of caution on
his part," the court of appeals concluded that the affidavit from the
seller's expert alone was enough to create an issue of fact as to whether
the defect was patent.42 Specifically, the court found contradictory the
assertions by seller's expert that the defect was nonexistent yet somehow
patent. 43

36. Id.
37. Buford v. Toys R' Us, Inc., 217 Ga. App. 565,567,458 S.E.2d 373,375 (1995) (citing
Alltrade v. McDonald, 213 Ga. App. 758, 445 S.E.2d 856 (1994)).
38. See, e.g., Keaton v. A.B.C. Drug Co., 266 Ga. 385, 386-87, 467 S.E.2d 558, 561

(1996), rev'g sub nom., A.B.C. Drug Co. v. Monroe, 214 Ga. App. 136, 139, 447 S.E.2d 315,
319 (1994); Moore v. Berry, 217 Ga. App. 697, 697, 458 S.E.2d 879, 880 (1995); Smith v.
Northeast Ga. Fair Ass'n, 85 Ga. App. 32, 36, 67 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1951).
39. 266 Ga. at 387, 467 S.E.2d at 560.
40. Id. Warranty liability in Keaton was predicated on the supreme court's initial
finding in this case that privity had arisen between the putative buyer and the seller, when
in fact the buyer had not yet purchased the bottle of bleach. As indicated above (see text
accompanying supra notes 20-22), the supreme court's decision in this regard is open to
criticism.
41. 217 Ga. App. 697, 458 S.E.2d 879 (1995).
42. Id. at 697, 458 S.E.2d at 880.
43. Id.
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Sellers who are sued for breach of warranty also commonly raise lack
of privity as a defense. Thus, where a warranty arises from a contract
for the sale of goods,
it can only run to a buyer who is in privity of contract with the seller.
If a defendant is not the seller to the plaintiff-purchaser, the plaintiff
as the ultimate purchaser cannot recover on the implied or express
warranty, if any, arising out of the prior sale by the defendant to the
original purchaser, such as distributor or retailer from whom plaintiff
purchased the product."

However, some situations can create the requisite privity, as when the
manufacturer of goods issues a warranty to the purchaser through an
authorized dealer.4 ' The privity defense was successfully raised by a
manufacturer in the survey period case of Cobb County School District
v. MAT Factory,Inc.,"6 in which the court found that no privity existed

between the manufacturer of playground surface material and the Cobb
County School District because the contract for the surface material was
between the manufacturer and Cobb County's contractor.4 7
Whereas the implied warranty of merchantability arises in every
contract for the sale of goods,48 another warranty implied by Article 2
is dependent upon the intent and conduct of buyer and seller. Thus,
[wjhere the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer
is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is unless excluded or modified under Code Section 11-2316 an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.4'
Express warranty liability is not a prerequisite for warranty liability
under this code section. 50
The fitness warranty "envisages a specific use by the buyer which is
peculiar to the nature of his business ... and also requires that the

44. Cobb County School Dist. v. MAT Factory, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 697, 702, 452 S.E.2d
140, 145 (1994) (internal quotations omitted).
45. See, e.g., Jones v. Cranman's Sporting Goods, 142 Ga. App. 838, 237 S.E.2d 402
(1977).
46. 215 Ga. App. 697, 452 S.E.2d 140 (1994).
47. Id. at 702, 452 S.E.2d at 145.
48. This is assuming of course that the warranty of merchantability has not been
disclaimed or modified. See O.C.G.A. § 11-2-316(2), (3) (1994).
49. Id. § 11-2-315.
50. Nelson v. C.M. City, Inc., 218 Ga. App. 850, 853, 463 S.E.2d 902, 905 (1995), cert.
granted (1996).
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seller know the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment.""'
Because the buyer's intended use of the goods must be "peculiar," there
may be no recovery under the implied fitness warranty where the
buyer's use of goods is the same as all other users. For example, where
a buyer merely tells his seller that he wants tires for his pickup truck,
the seller's advice to him on the proper size and type will not imply a
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose: "Knowledge by [the seller]
that the tires were to be used on the truck is not knowledge of a2
'particular purpose' within the meaning of O.C.G.A. section 11-2-315."1
The use of tires on a truck is not a "particular purpose" because it is
"peculiar" to no one buyer.
C. Acceptance and Rejection
One way for "acceptance" to occur under Article 2 is for the buyer to
do "any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership." 3 For example,
in one survey period case,54 buyer agreed to assist in liquidating overstocked inventory held by seller. Seller shipped the merchandise to
buyer, who in turn liquidated it. Buyer then refused to remit the
proceeds of the liquidation to seller. Regarding the issue of acceptance,
the court found that buyer's liquidation was "an act inconsistent with
[the seller's] ownership."5
Acceptance may also occur where the buyer fails to reject the goods
after having "a reasonable opportunity to inspect them."56 Although
what length of time will constitute a "reasonable opportunity" is a
function of the facts of each case, any period of time longer than one
year appears inherently suspect.57
"Acceptance" has several effects under Article 2. Not only does it
obligate the buyer to "pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted," 8
it also precludes rejection. 9 Acceptance is also the act from which the
"reasonable time" period in which a buyer must notify his seller of any

51. Jones v. Marcus, 217 Ga. App. 372,373,457 S.E.2d 271,272 (1995) (quoting in part
from Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315 cmt. 2) (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. O.C.G.A. § 11-2-606(1)(c) (1994).
54. Contract Sales & Serv. Intl, Inc. v. American Express Travel Related Serv. Co., 216
Ga. App. 61, 453 S.E.2d 62 (1994).
55. Id. at 61, 453 S.E.2d at 63.
56. O.C.G.A. § 11-2-606(1Xb) (1994).

57. See, e.g., Cobb County School Dist. v. MAT Factory, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 697, 702-03,
452 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1994).

58. O.C.G.A. § 11-2-607(1) (1994).
59. Id. § 11-2-607(2); ContractSales & Ser'. Int'l, Inc., 216 Ga. App. at 62, 453 S.E.2d

at 63.
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defect is measured.' Failure to so notify the seller after acceptance
precludes the buyer from any remedy.6' Although what constitutes a
reasonable time period under O.C.G.A. section 11-2-607(3) differs
according to the circumstances of each case, courts are not inclined to
accept as seasonable notice the filing of a lawsuit at the end of the twoyear limitations period. 2
By citing to O.C.G.A. section 11-2-607(3) (notice of breach after
acceptance), the court in Cobb County muddled the issue of whether
notice of rejection occurred within a reasonable time." The court's
analysis thus suggests that whether notice of breach and notice of
rejection were made within a "reasonable time" are equivalent inquiries.'
However, a "reasonable time" within which goods must be
accepted or rejected may, in certain cases, differ from the "reasonable
time" within which a buyer is required to notify his seller of breach.
D. Damages
The most noteworthy damages decision under Article 2 during the
survey period was Nelson v. C.M. City, Inc.65 In Nelson, a defective
television caused a fire in consumer-plaintiff's home. Defendant-seller
Curtis Mathes ("C.M.") had held the television out as one it had
manufactured by placing its name on the television, when in fact C.M.
had done nothing more than arrange for the television's assembly by
different components manufacturers. NEC manufactured the television's
chassis; another company placed the cabinet on the chassis; and only
then was the television shipped to C.M. In plaintiff's suit for damages,
defendant-seller argued that its exclusion of incidental and consequential
damages in the sales contract barred plaintiff's warranty-based damages
that such an exclusion
claim. The trial court agreed with seller, ruling
66
was not unconscionable as a matter of law.

The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the issue was one for the
jury:
[Consumer] bought this television because of Curtis Mathes's name and
reputation for manufacturing quality, non-defective products "backed"
by Curtis Mathes. The warranty exclusion in this case was imposed by

60. Cobb County School Dist., 215 Ga. App. at 702, 452 S.E.2d at 146 (citing O.C.G.A.
§ 11-2-607(3)).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Buford v. Toys R' Us, 217 Ga. App. 565, 567, 458 S.E.2d 373, 375 (1995).
63. 215 Ga. App. at 702, 452 S.E.2d at 146.
64. Id.
65. 218 Ga. App. 850, 463 S.E.2d 902 (1995), cert. granted (1996).
66. Id. at 850, 463 S.E.2d at 903.
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Curtis Mathes as the only condition by which [consumer] could acquire
the reputedly high-quality Curtis Mathes product, and it resembled a
law more than a meeting of the minds .... It may have been deemed
by [consumer] that because CurtisMathes manufacturedthe television,
a provision for consequential damages such as fire damage to their
home was superfluous. Thus, in the jury's view it may be unconscionable for Curtis Mathes to take advantage of its name to ... sell.., a
product as a high-quality product while failing to disclose that it did
not actually manufacture that product, and then, by using a one-sided
warranty, immunize itself from liability67for damages arising out of such
defective product sold in that manner.
Although similar exclusions had been upheld as not unconscionable in
other cases," the foregoing facts convinced the court of appeals that a
jury should decide the issue in this case. 9
The court of appeals clearly disapproved of the seller, C.M., placing its
name on a television set that it had arranged to be manufactured by
others.7" The court's considerable reliance on this fact suggests (but
does not require the conclusion) that brand name sellers may not exclude
consequential damages. It seems that this result can best be explained
as a reaction to recent legislation insulating sellers such as C.M. from
strict tort product liability.
In Alitrade, Inc. v. McDonald," the defendant in a strict product
liability action defended on the grounds that it was merely a "product
seller" as defined in O.C.G.A. section 51-1-11.1 and was accordingly
immune from the strict tort liability imposed upon a "manufacturer" by
O.C.G.A. section 51-1-11.72 Faced with the plain language of the
statute, the court agreed: "An entity which merely affixes its label to a
product and sells it under its name is a product seller rather than a
manufacturer... and is not liable in a product liability action based on
the doctrine of strict liability in tort. 7 3 However, a special concurrence
by Judge Pope expressed a desire that the legislature amend the
statute.7 4 Specifically, Judge Pope found it unjust that a company
should be immune from strict product liability when it "has put its own

67.
68.
(1991);
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 854, 463 S.E.2d at 905-906.
See Sharpe v. General Motors Corp., 198 Ga. App. 313, 315, 401 S.E.2d 328, 331
Fiat Auto USA v. Hollums, 185 Ga. App. 113, 114, 363 S.E.2d 312, 314 (1987).
218 Ga. App. at 855, 463 S.E.2d at 906.
Id. at 852, 463 S.E.2d at 904.
213 Ga. App. 758, 445 S.E.2d 856 (1994).
Id. at 759, 445 S.E.2d at 857.
Id. at 760, 445 S.E.2d at 858.
Id. at 761, 445 S.E.2d at 859 (Pope, C.J., concurring specially).
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trade name on a product, thus leading the public to believe it manufactured the product even though it did not."76
Nelson is simply a reaction to Judge Pope's concurrence. 7' The court
of appeals, as already noted, vigorously disapproved of C.M. holding out
a product as its own that it had not produced; thus, the court sought
justice through a strict application of Alltrade, finding that C.M. was not
77
a "product seller" and was thus subject to strict product liability.

Because of the legislature's apparent unwillingness to amend O.C.G.A.
section 51-1-11.1, the court of appeals judicially ameliorated the harsher
effects of the statute through a strict construction of its terms. 7 By
limiting the efficacy of a consequential damages exclusion, the court in
Nelson ensured the availability of alternative remedies (such as
consequential damages for breach of warranty) against those who might
qualify as product sellers. Viewing Nelson in this light, its holding with
regard to consequential damages exclusions is properly restricted to
those who might be classified as "product sellers" under O.C.G.A. section
51-1-11.1.

III.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

A.

Scope of Article Nine
Article 9 of Georgia's Commercial Code applies: "(a) [tlo any
transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security
interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, documents,
instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper, or accounts; and also (b)
[t]o any sale of accounts or chattel paper."79 Courts often have difficulty applying the foregoing definition to those transactions that, while
structured to resemble a security interest, are more properly characterized as leases. Because the parties' intentions are frequently muddled
by conflicting motivations, which of course differ with each case, deciding
whether a transaction is "intended to create a security interest" can be
a daunting task.
The importance and difficulty of deciding whether the parties
"intended" the transaction to be a "true lease" is most obvious in
bankruptcy. Although upon entering the transaction the debtor may

75.

Id.

76. See Nelson v. C.M. City, Inc., 218 Ga. App. at 853, 463 S.E.2d at 905 ("The fair
result advocated by Chief Judge Pope is reached in this case, however, by focusing more
precisely on the exact language of O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11.1 . ..... )

77. Id. at 851, 463 S.E.2d at 904.
78. Id. at 851-52, 463 S.E.2d at 904-05.
79. O.C.G.A. § 11-9-102(1) (1994).
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have wished to call the transaction a lease for tax purposes,80 once in
bankruptcy he may "propose to characterize the transaction as a sale...
then value the property and bifurcate the claim between secured and
unsecured components." 1 If the transaction is in fact a sale, or if the
lessor does not want the property returned to again be leased, such a
recharacterization is fair. For example, a creditor outside of bankruptcy
could hope to obtain, at most, the property's fair market value upon
resale. The deficiency between the loan amount and the amount realized
upon foreclosure would nine times out of ten be uncollectible against a
debtor who could not pay the debt according to its terms in the first
instance. Thus, in bankruptcy the creditor's outcome is actually better.
The situation is different for lessors, as recognized by the Bankruptcy
Code. A debtor must accept or reject the lease according to its terms;
and if rejected, the property must be returned to the lessor.8 2 This
requirement is based on the notion that most lessors want to again lease
the subject property. *Allowing a debtor to bifurcate a lease claim
disadvantages the typical lessor, who would be better off if the bankruptcy had not occurred because a lessor can obtain much more money from
re-leasing the property than from debtor's payment of the secured
portion. Therefore, permitting recharacterization in this situation would
prejudice lessors and allow debtors to have both the tax advantage of a
lease outside bankruptcy and the benefit of bifurcation in bankruptcy.
It is against this backdrop that bankruptcy courts are asked to decide
whether a transaction is a lease or a disguised sale. The debtor in In re
Paz, 3 wishing to retain the property, contended that the "lease" was
actually a disguised sale. After discussing the foregoing motivations
that are present in such a situation, the court construed the agreement
under O.C.G.A. section 11-1-201(37), as revised in 1993.4 For a
transaction to be a "security agreement" under that provision, the debtor
must be incapable of terminating the agreement, and one of the
following conditions must exist:
(a) The original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the
remaining economic life of the goods,
(b) The lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic
life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods,

80. See In re Paz, 179 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995).
81. Id. at 745. The court's decision in Paz contains an excellent discussion of this issue.

82. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
83. 179 B.R. at 743.
84. Id. at 746.
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(c) The lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining
economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal
additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement, or
(d) The lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no
additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon
compliance with the lease agreement."
Although the court performed at least a cursory analysis of each of these
factors, by far the most instructive is the court's analysis of "additional
nominal consideration." After running the numbers, the court found
that a residual payment of $3,303.12 was not nominal when compared
to either the ultimate capital cost of the property ($12,129.56) or the
original purchase price ($10,000). 6 Because none of the four factors
applied, the transaction at issue was a lease. 7
Article 9 not only excludes transactions according to form (like leases),
but also according to subject matter. Thus, certain types of property are
specifically excluded from Article 9. For example, FCC broadcast
licenses may not be subject to a security interest. This exclusion
undoubtedly makes financing more difficult for those seeking to enter
the broadcast industry. However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
8
holding in In re Beach Television lPartners"
should make financing
more available and lower barriers to market entry for those without the
capital to self-finance. There, the Eleventh Circuit held that "creditors
can perfect a security interest in the private right of the proceeds from
an FCC approved sale of a broadcast license." 9 Although FCC licenses
themselves may still not be "hypothecated by way of mortgage, lien,
pledge, lease, etc.," the ability of lenders to obtain a security interest in
the proceeds of an FCC approved sale of the license should make market
entry much easier for those who cannot self-finance the purchase of such
a license. 9
Article 9 also excludes transactions that create or transfer "an interest
in or lien on real estate, including a lease or rents thereunder."9 1 The

85. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 11-1-201(37)). The essence of each element in O.C.G.A.

§

11-1-201(37) is that the lessee might one day become the owner of the property. As the
court in City Food Mart u. Bell Atlantic recognized, "[t]he prime essential distinction
between a lease and a conditional sale is that in a lease the lessee never owns the
property." 218 Ga. App. 57, 57-58, 460 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1995) (quoting Ford v. Rolins
Protective Serv. Co., 171 Ga. App. 882, 884, 322 S.E.2d 62, 64 (1984)).
86. 179 B.R. at 748.
87. Id. at 749.
88. 38 F.3d 535 (11th Cir. 1994).
89. Id. at 537.

90. Id.
91.

O.C.G.A. § 11-9-104(h) (1994).
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2 sought to categorize its
creditor in Chen v. Profit Sharing Plan"
transaction with debtor as one covered by this exclusion so that the
creditor would not be obliged to comply with the notice requirement
contained in O.C.G.A. section 11-9-505(2). 9' The creditor argued that
the collateral given by debtor-a promissory note and security deed
encumbering real property in debtor's favor-involved "the creation or
transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate" and was thus outside of
Article 9." The court of appeals disagreed, finding that although the
underlying note and security deed assigned as collateral did involve real
property, the creditor "only acquired a lien against the commercial
The underlying note
paper, i.e., the security deed and the note."'
given as security (not its subsequent assignment by debtor) had created
the interest in real property, and there was no transfer of an interest in
real property as the creditor only acquired a lien against the paper itself,
"Consequently, since the
and not the underlying real property."
transaction... never resulted in the 'creation' or 'transfer' of an interest
in or lien against real property, the [creditor) was not exempt from
required under Article 9 of Georgia's
complying with any notice provision
97
Uniform Commercial Code."
As a final survey period note on Article 9 coverage, creditors should
remember that "[elxcept for mobile homes permanently attached to
realty, mobile homes are personal property, not real property, and are
governed by O.C.G.A. section 40-3-1, the Motor Vehicle Certificate of
Title Act, and O.C.G.A. section 11-9-101, the Uniform Commercial
Code."' 8

92. 216 Ga. App. 878, 456 S.E.2d 237 (1995).
93. Id. at 880-81, 456 S.E.2d at 240-41. Specifically, the creditor in Chen wanted to
retain the subject collateral--commercial paper assigned by debtor to the creditor as
security-in satisfaction of the underlying debt after default by the debtor. If such a
transaction is covered by Article 9, the creditor is required to provide debtor written notice
of his intention to do so after default. O.C.G.A. § 11-9-505(2) (1996). Because the creditor
in Chen had not complied with this requirement, it sought to avoid the necessity for
compliance therewith by arguing that the transaction was outside the scope of Article 9.
216 Ga. App. at 881, 456 S.E.2d at 241.
94. 216 Ga. App. at 881, 456 S.E.2d at 241.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Griswell v. Columbus Fin. Co., 220 Ga. App. 803, 804, 470 S.E.2d 256, 257 (1996).
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Creation and Perfection

1. Generally. Unless a creditor takes the steps necessary to create
and perfect its interest in collateral prior to the death of its borrower,
the creditor may find itself shut out by a probate court's award of a
year's support to the surviving spouse. A "[ylear's support to the family,
duly set apart in the collateral prior to the perfection of the subject
security interest, takes priority over such security interest."' In Auto
Alignment Services, Inc. v. Bray,"° the creditor claimed priority to the
decedent's stock certificates which had been included in a probate court's
award of a year's support to the decedents family. 1 The court of
appeals rejected the creditor's claim, finding that there was insufficient
evidence of the creditor's creation and perfection of an interest in the
stock.10 2 "In order to perfect an interest in corporate stock, the stock
certificate must be delivered to the secured party, accompanied by a
stock pledge agreement." 3 Because the creditor did not show possession of a stock pledge agreement, there was no creation or perfection
°4 and
the priority rules of O.C.G.A. section 11-9-310(a) did not apply.'
Perfection in many instances is not a one-time occurrence: a debtor's
name change may necessitate the filing of a new financing statement;
the debtor may move the collateral from one state to another, again
necessitating refiling; or the creditor may need to refile after five years
when the financing statement expires. In addition to these situations
which require creditors be diligent, creditors who finance the acquisition
of used motor vehicles should be aware that a security interest in a
motor vehicle weighing less than ten thousand pounds "shall lapse
unless a notice of such security interest or lien is filed with the
commissioner within 30 days from the date such vehicle becomes [15
model years old."'0 ' Although the statute providing for lapse does not
specify how creditors are to determine when a vehicle becomes 15 model
years old, the bankruptcy court in In re Perkins... used tables from the
Georgia Department of Revenue to decide the question. Under that
method, "a 1978 vehicle became 15 model years old as of September 1,
1991. Similarly, a 1979 vehicle became 15 model years old as of

99.
100.
101.
102.
103,

O.C.G.A. § 11-9-310(l)(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
214 Ga. App. 53, 446 S.E.2d 753 (1994).
Id. at 53, 446 S.E.2d at 754.
Id. at 55, 446 S.E.2d at 755.
Id.

104. Id.

105. O.C.G.A. § 40-3-4(14)(C)(i) (1994).
106. 169 B.R. 455 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1994).
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Creditors should thus comply with O.C.G.A.

section 40-3-4(14)(C)(i) by October 1 of each year as to all motor vehicles
in which they have a security interest that will attain 15 model years of
age under this formula.
As a final note regarding perfection, Georgia recently adopted a new
system for filing financing statements whereby the filing of financing
statements in any county of the state will perfect a security interest in
most types of personal property collateral." s The new system also
establishes a central indexing system for all financing statements. 09
Removing any confusion about the effective date of this legislation, the
Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Trust Co. Bank v. GeorgiaSuperior
Court Clerks' Cooperative Authority"0 unequivocally states, "the
legislature intended for January 111, 1995, to be the effective date for the
new filing and indexing system."
2. Cross-Collateralization Problems. Although the rule of thumb
for determining priority among creditors is first to file is first in right,
the holder of a purchase money security interest in inventory has
priority over a conflicting security interest in the same inventory."2
In addition, the Bankruptcy Code"' makes purchase money status
vital to retailers of household furnishings and goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, and other merchandise that are considered primarily for a
debtor's household use. As long as such a retailer maintains purchase
money status, the avoidance power found in 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) cannot
be used against it.
Both types of lenders, inventory financiers and retailers selling on
credit, encounter problems when they attempt to consolidate purchase
money debt and collateral. This occurs when collateral that is already
used to secure purchase money debt is pledged as additional collateral
(cross-collateralized) for future purchases, and items of collateral

107. Id. at 458. Although the court noted that one might argue that a 1978 model
purchased late in 1978 would not become 15 model years old until late 1993, the method
used by the Georgia Department of Revenue took into account the fact that next year's car
models are actually sold late in the preceding year, i.e., a "1978 vehicle was first offered
for sale in the fall of 1977." Id. at 458 n.1.

108. Trust Co. Bank v. Georgia Superior Court Clerks' Office Coop. Auth., 265 Ga. 390,
456 S.E.2d 571 (1995) (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-9-401(1) (1994)).
109. Id. at 390, 456 S.E.2d at 571 (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-9-407 (1994)).
110. 265 Ga. 390, 456 S.E.2d 571 (1995).
111. Id. at 390-91, 456 S.E.2d at 572.
112. In re Lee, 169 B.R. 790, 792 n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-9-

312(3) (1994)).
113. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
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subsequently purchased are used as collateral for pre-existing debt. The
result is that later purchased items may secure earlier debt, and
although a debtor may actually pay off a particular item of collateral, it
remains encumbered as collateral for subsequent purchase money debt.
The problem with such a result is that "[tlo the extent an item of
collateral secures some other kind of debt, the security interest in an
item is not purchase money."114 With paid-off items of collateral still
serving as security for subsequent purchase money debt, and subsequent
purchase money collateral serving as security for earlier purchase money
debt, it is impossible to ascertain the extent to which each item of
collateral secures its own price.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this problem in
Southtrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp.,"'
stating:
Without some guidelines, legislative or contractual, the court should
not be required to distill from a mass of transactions the extent to
which a security interest is purchase money. Unless a lender
contractually provides some method for determining the extent to
which each item of collateral secures116its purchase money, it effectively
gives up its purchase money status.
Creditors can thus maintain purchase money status in the crosscollateralization context by creating within the security agreement a
payment allocation method which provides some method for determining
the extent to which each item of collateral secures "all or part of its
price."" 7
Decisions subsequent to Southtrust have strictly construed payment
allocation methods in cross-collateralization situations. In In re
Freeman,"' the Eleventh Circuit rejected a payment allocation method
because the allocation formula failed to specify how payments were9 to be
applied among an item's purchase price, sales tax, and interest."

114. Lee, 169 B.R. at 793 (quoting In re Fickey, 23 B.R. 586, 588 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982)). This rule stems from the definition of "purchase money security interest," which
exists only to the extent that it is "[t]aken or retained by the seller of the collateral to
secure all or part of its price ... " O.C.G.A. § 11-9-107(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
115. 760 F.2d 1240 (11th Cir. 1985).
116. Id. at 1243 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
117. O.C.G.A. § 11-9-107(a) (1994); see also Southtrust, 760 F.2d at 1243 (allocation

method necessary to determine extent to which each item of collateral secures its "purchase
money").

118. 956 F.2d 252 (11th Cir. 1992).
119. Id. at 255.
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In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit implicitly adopt[ed] the narrow
interpretation that "the all or part of its price" provision found in the
definition of purchase money security interest ... refers only to the
"cash price" of the collateral purchased in the transaction and not to
other amounts associated with the cost of the credit transaction such
as finance, insurance or other charges. 2 '

Faced with what it deemed the binding precedent of Freeman,the survey
period decision in In re Lee invalidated a creditor's purchase money
status because the payment formula in its security agreement similarly
did not allocate payments "among sales tax, interest, insurance and
purchase price. " "'
In contrast to Freeman and Lee, another bankruptcy court during the
survey period upheld a creditor's purchase money status in the context
of a retail charge account agreement where the formula was as follows:
I hereby grant you a purchase money security interest in each item of
property purchased by me ... from you, which means you keep an
interest in the property until I pay for it as explained in this AgreeSuch security interest will secure the total amount due
ment ....
from time to time on such item, together with any finance charges,
insurance charges, warranty service charges, and non-filing fees
applicable to such item, and will remain in such item until the total
cash price and any finance charges, insurance charges, warranty
service charges and non-filing fees have been paid in full. You may
apply payments on my account first to any unpaid finance charges,
insurance charges, warranty service charges, and non-filing fees in the
order such charges are incurred, and then to the total cash price of my
purchases in the order such purchases are made. Items will be paid for
in the order in which they are purchased; and, if items are purchased
on the same date, the items will be considered paid for in the order of
their cash price, with the lowest priced item being considered paid for
first.122
The formula makes no mention of sales tax and does not define cash
price. The creditor in Carteronly asserted purchase money status with
regard to three items that had not been paid for in full under the
payment formula; the creditor did not claim purchase money status as
to six other items, which had been paid for in full under the formula. 12' Although the court did not discuss Freeman, it did cite South-

120.
121.
122.
123.

Lee, 169 B.R. at 793-94.
Id. at 794.
In re Carter, 180 B.R. 321, 322 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1995) (emphasis added).

Id.
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trust, finding that this formula "'provides some method for determining
to which each item of collateral secures its purchase
the extent
12 4
money.' "
The result in Carter is much more realistic. Although application of
payment to those portions of the debt not representing an item's cash
price is permissive, and sales tax is not dealt with, the formula was
sufficient to ensure purchase money status for the creditor. The court
in Lee, apparently dismayed at Freeman's strict construction of cash
price, cited contrary authority in which a panel from the Third Circuit
stated: "We have little difficulty in concluding that 'price' includes not
only the actual costs of the goods but also financing charges and sales
tax. That interpretation of the statute is but a recognition25 of the
realities of the market place in today's credit-oriented society."1
3. Rents. A creditor's entitlement to post-petition rents assigned to
it by a deed to secure debt currently depends upon whether the debtor
files bankruptcy in the Northern, Middle, or Southern District of
Georgia.'26 When a debtor assigns rents to the secured party under
the terms of a deed to secure debt, Georgia law provides that the secured
party obtains only an inchoate right therein.'27 When debtor files
bankruptcy, the question becomes whether the creditor had taken
"sufficient [pre-petition] acts of 'enforcement' under Georgia law to give
[the creditor] a present choate interest in the rents."121 In other words,
has the creditor rendered its right to rents "choate" through "the
necessary affirmative steps and actions to displace the Debtor from
collecting the rents"?" Two survey period decisions highlight the fact

124. Id. at 324 (quoting Southtrust, 760 F.2d at 1243).
125. In re Pristas, 742 F.2d 797, 800 (3d Cir. 1984).
126. CompareIn re May, 169 B.R. 462 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994), and In re Jones, 77 B.R.
981 (Bankr. M.D. Ga: 1987), with Real Estate West Ventures v. Gingold, 170 B.R. 736
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
127. See, e.g., In re Polo Club Apartments, 150 B.R. 840, 851 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993)
(construing Georgia cases on whether out-of-possession security deed grantee has present
right to receive rents solely by reason of default).
128. May, 169 B.R. at 468.
129. Real Estate West Ventures, 170 B.R. at 741.
Use of the term "choate" should not be confused to mean that the bankruptcy estate has
been divested of all rights in rents. As used herein, a "choate" right under Georgia law
means only that the creditor has a present enforceable right to the rents superior to the
trustee or debtor in possession, i.e., a lien that has been perfected pre-petition. Thus, even
where the creditor's right to rents is found to be "choate," the estate will retain an interest
sufficient to "allow a debtor-in-possession to use such rents in the operation of its business
... subject to the restrictions placed upon the rents as 'cash collateral.'" May, 169 B.R. at
470-71. In May the court found that the creditor "ha[d] a perfected, choate lien against the
rents under the Assignment." Id. at 472.
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that bankruptcy courts in the Northern District of Georgia answer this
question differently from the Middle and Southern Districts. 3 '
One line of cases, developed in the Middle and Southern Districts,
interprets Georgia law as requiring "a literal reading of the contract to
determine what act of enforcement shall be required."'3 1 These courts
look to the language of the assignment of rents clause to decide whether
the creditor's pre-petition conduct complied therewith.3 2 As long as
the creditor so complied, it has a perfected, choate right to the rents.
Accordingly, if the security agreement contains an unconditional
assignment of rents clause the creditor "is not required to take any
action after default to entitle it to the rents thereunder." 33
The second line of cases from the Northern District reads Georgia law
as follows:
[Riegardless of the language contained in the assignment of rents, a
security-deed grantee who has not taken some dispossessory action
(i.e., appointment of state receiver, ejection action or notice of interest
in rents to all tenants) to enforce its interest, is not entitled to the
rents derived from the property.'
This conclusion is premised on the notion that "possession of the subject
property is the touchstone in Georgia when determining entitlement to
3 5 Under this reading, "[it is necessary for the creditor to take
rents.""
[some affirmative act] despite any unconditional language in the security
agreement."'36
The prospect of bankruptcy adds importance to this distinction, which
may in other respects appear simply academic. Assume that the debtor
files for reorganization under Chapter 11. If a creditor is capable of
showing a perfected, choate right to rents that is recognized by 11 U.S.C.
§ 552(b), then the rents may be characterized as "cash collateral" under
11 U.S.C. § 363(a). In that event, a debtor in possession under Chapter
11 may not use the rents in its reorganization unless the creditor
consents or the court authorizes the use thereof.' 7 By showing a

130. Compare May, 169 B.R. at 468-71, with Real Estate West, 170 B.R. at 740-42.
131. May, 169 B.R. at 469 (citing Jones, 77 B.R. at 984, and In re Moore, No. 488-00105

(Bankr. S.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 1988)).
132. Id.

133. Id.
134. Id. (citing In re Polo Club Apartments, 150 B.R. 840 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993)).
135. Id.
136. Real Estate West, 170 B.R. at 741 (citing Polo Club, 150 B.R. at 850).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (1993 & Supp. 1996) (trustee may not use, sell or lease cash
collateral unless "each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents").
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perfected, choate right to rents, a creditor substantially protects its
position in a debtor's reorganization.
Under Chapter 7, if the creditor fails to establish a perfected, choate
right to rents, it may arguably cause the creditor to lose out to the
liquidating trustee. In a Chapter 7 proceeding, "the liquidating trustee
has no section 363 right to the rents.""s Therefore, the creditor's
concern is rather with the prospect that the liquidating trustee, "as
successor to the debtor's rights, would arguably retain the rents, in
contravention of the loan documents, and state law, unless the lender
had taken possession pre-petition.""3 9
Under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, the bottom line is whether the
creditor has taken the steps necessary to ensure a perfected, choate right
to rents. In either the Middle or Southern Districts, the question is
answered simply by measuring the creditor's conduct against the
requirements of the assignment of rents clause. Looking to the Northern
4
District by contrast, the survey period case of Real Estate West' 0
provides guidance on what steps are necessary. In that case, creditor
had sent debtor's managing agent a letter pre-petition, after which the
managing agent discontinued disbursement of rentals to debtor.141
Further, the parties agreed that the creditor was in control of the rental
property at a pre-petition meeting." After the meeting, the creditor
accelerated the loan and advertised foreclosure, which was stayed by the
filing of the petition." In light of these facts, the court found that the
creditor "had taken affirmative actions and positive steps to displace the
Debtor from control over collecting the rents."'" Until the Eleventh
Circuit or a Georgia appellate court issues a decision resolving this
conflict, practitioners will simply have to live with this troubling
inconsistency.
C. Default and ForeclosureIssues
Proceeding towards realization upon collateral and in hopes of
collecting a deficiency judgment, creditors must avoid numerous pitfalls;
several of these were dealt with during the survey period.

138. May, 169 B.R. at 470 n.14.
139. Id.
140. 170 B.R. at 738.
141. Id. at 741. That letter reads: "[Wie do not want any more disbursements made
to the owners on either the Milledgeville or Augusta projects owned by [the Debtor]. Our
rent and lease assignments give us the authority to control the utilization of the rental
income." Id.
142. Id. at 741-42.
143. Id. at 738.
144. Id. at 742.
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1. Determining and Declaring Default. In many instances, the
first hurdle is making an appropriate determination that the debtor has
in fact defaulted. A proper determination by a creditor that the debtor
is in default under the terms of the security agreement 145 is important

because it can insulate a creditor from a claim of wrongful repossession
by the debtor. In Fulton v. Anchor Savings Bank,' 14 plaintiff bought
a car under a retail installment sales contract, which was subsequently
assigned to Bank. Plaintiff was only delinquent in making her monthly
payment one time in early 1989 when Bank closed the branch office
where plaintiff hand delivered her payments and posted an incorrect
address to which customers should forward payment. In December 1988,
Bank
plaintiff gave Bank notice of her change of address; however,
47
continued to mail correspondence to plaintiff's old address.
On March 16, 1989, Bank mailed a notice to plaintiff's former address
stating that if she failed to confirm the existence of insurance on the car,
the bank would procure a policy at plaintiff's expense. Because plaintiff
never received this notice, Bank obtained an insurance policy on the car.
Plaintiff had in fact maintained insurance on her car throughout the
loan repayment period, and in December 1989, Bank was named as copayee on a check from plaintiff's insurance company for damage to
plaintiff's car. Notwithstanding this, Bank obtained yet another
insurance policy on plaintiff's car. Although the premiums for the
policies obtained by Bank were charged against plaintiff's loan account,
Bank did not seek reimbursement until after plaintiff had paid off her
loan.' 4'
After the loan was paid off, Bank sent a notice to plaintiff's former
address, stating that if plaintiff failed to confirm the existence of
insurance on her vehicle during the period for which Bank obtained
insurance policies, Bank would add those amounts to plaintiff's loan
account. Again, plaintiff never received the notice. Three more notices
followed, each sent to plaintiff's former address, and each demanded
payment for the cost of insurance policies obtained by Bank. The second
of the three subsequent notices also purported to assess a late charge for
the payment in early 1989, when Bank had closed its branch office and

provided customers an inaccurate forwarding address. Plaintiff, having

145. Because Article 9 does not define default, the parties' agreement on what

constitutes "default" controls. Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co., 119 Ga. App. 813, 818, 168
S.E.2d 827, 830 (1969).
146. 215 Ga. App. 456, 452 S.E.2d 208 (1994).
147. Id. at 457-60, 452 S.E.2d at 210-13.
148. Id.
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never received any of these notices, did not respond. Bank then began
the process of self-help repossession.149
When plaintiff sued for wrongful repossession, Bank claimed that
debtor's default precluded such a claim. Most notably, Bank pointed to
the plaintiff's failure to name Bank as a loss-payee during the loan
period and to pay the late fee from early 1989."0 The court refused to
accept plaintiff's failure to name Bank as a loss-payee under the
insurance policy as causing default and explained that:
[i]t can hardly be said that this omission constituted a bona fide event
of default authorizing repossession of plaintiff's car since it is undisputed that... Bank did not base repossession of the collateral on the fact
that it was not named as a loss-payee under the plaintiffs motor
vehicle liability insurance policies ....

It thus follows that ... Bank

may not defend plaintiff's claim of wrongful repossession on an issue
of default it did not rely on as a basis of repossession and which in no
way is connected to the cause of repossession."' 1
In the wake of this holding, creditors should be careful to specify in any
communication with the debtor any and all events that have caused
default, and further specify that the creditor is relying jointly and
severally on these events as the basis for repossession. 52
When a creditor contemplates a declaration that the debtor is in
default under the terms of the security agreement, he may do so only
with the "good faith belie[f] that the prospect of payment or performance

149. Id.
150. Id. at 466-67, 452 S.E.2d 216-17. Bank also raised plaintiff's failure to properly
notify it of her change of address. The court of appeals concluded that this presented a
question of fact to be decided by a jury. Id.
151. Id. at 464, 452 S.E.2d at 215. On similar grounds, the court rejected Bank's
contention that nonpayment of the early 1989 late fee was an appropriate event of default
on which to base repossession. In any event, general contract principles excused plaintiff
from making timely payment because the closing of the Bank's branch office resulted in
plaintiffs nonperformance. Id. at 467,452 S.E.2d at 217 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-4-23 (1994)).
152. The holding in Fulton suggests that a creditor may not include in such a
communication an all-encompassing phrase, such as "and any other event of default which
may subsequently come to light." The thrust of Fulton is that creditors should investigate
how a debtor is in default, and only then begin self-help repossession. Failure to perform
a thorough review of a debtor's file prior to declaring default may come back to haunt a
creditor if its determination regarding default is incorrect. For example, the plaintiff in
Fulton also sought recovery for Bank's failure to exercise good faith, an obligation imposed
on all U.C.C. contracts by O.C.G.A. § 11-1-208. The court of appeals found Bank's "good
faith" to be at issue because "it acted without checking the facts before ordering
repossession of plaintiffs automobile." Id. at 468, 452 S.E.2d at 218.
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was impaired.""
In Flateau v. Reinhardt, Whitley & Wilmot,"' the
court of appeals was confronted by a debtor's claim that the creditor was
liable for not complying with these standards. The court summarily
concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that the creditor had
acted in bad faith when declaring default and seeking a writ for
immediate possession. 55 However, an analysis of the facts as recounted by the court suggest a rationale for this finding.
Defendants Means and his wife owned Al-Temp Service, Inc. ("AlTemp"); prior to dissolution, the assets were sold to Tifton Heating &
Cooling, Inc. ("Tifton"), which was owned by Rhodes. Under the terms
of the 1985 sales agreement, Tifton was to pay $20,000 down and make
120 consecutive monthly payments to Al-Temp under the terms of a
promissory note. The note and security agreement gave Al-Temp a
security interest in almost everything Tifton owned. The security
agreement also contained a "deemed insecure" clause allowing default if
"the secured party fe[lt] insecure for any reason whatsoever."15
The discovery that Rhodes was experiencing cash flow problems at
Tifton, combined with rumor from Tifton's employees that Rhodes was
closing the business, caused Means to approach his attorney with
concerns for the loss of easily transported collateral. Means and his
counsel at this point decided to declare a default and file a petition for
writ of immediate possession. Means and his counsel appeared before
a judge on January 23, and signed the writ for possession; however,
Means agreed to his counsel's suggestion that they attempt to contact
Rhodes and resolve the matter before seeking the writ's execution.
When these efforts failed, the writ was filed on January 25 and
execution sought thereon. The writ directed the sheriff to levy only on
the property described in the note.'57
Although the court did not elaborate on its conclusion that Means had
not demonstrated bad faith, several of the foregoing facts undoubtedly
led to that conclusion.1' s First, Means certainly had reason to feel
insecure, and Means recounted the facts supporting his feeling of
insecurity before a judge. Second, the petition was filed against Tifton,
not Rhodes. The writ only sought the property detailed as "security"
under the terms of the security agreement. This was obviously not a

153. Flateau v. Reinhardt, Whitley & Wilmot, 220 Ga. App. 188, 191, 469 S.E.2d 223,
226 (1996) (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-1-208 (1994)).
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 189, 469 S.E.2d at 224.
Id. at 188-90, 469 S.E.2d at 224-25.
Id. at 191, 469 S.E.2d at 226.
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case where Means was attempting to proceed against Rhodes personally.
Finally, Means had made at least two attempts to resolve the problem
with Rhodes-once at a meeting Rhodes admittedly failed to attend, and
a second time after the writ of possession had been signed by the

judge. 159
In his suit against Means and his attorney, Rhodes also contended
that the writ of possession was void, most notably due to Means' failure
to file a foreclosure petition prior to seeking the writ of immediate
possession. The court rejected this argument because in certain
circumstances a creditor seeking possession of collateral after default
may retain the collateral, thereby obviating the necessity of foreclosure. 160
2. Self-Help Repossession. The court of appeals decision in Fulton
v. Anchor Savings Bank' thoroughly dealt with creditor liability for
wrongful repossession. After deciding that the debtor was not in fact in
default, the court in Fulton addressed plaintiff's claim that the creditor's
conduct"6 2 constituted a breach of the peace. Plaintiff was aroused at
5:00 a.m. when a collection agent and two assistants hired by the
creditor went to her home to repossess her car. Plaintiff showed the
collection agent proof that she had in fact paid off the car loan, along
with other documentation demonstrating her right to ownership.
Plaintiff then called the police and tried to move the car from her
driveway into her garage. However, the collection agent and his
associates prevented her from doing so by standing in front of the
garage. Later, they complied with plaintiff's demand and moved. When
the police officer arrived, he told plaintiff that she was required to
relinquish her car to the collection agent and his two associates."
Notwithstanding the bank's contention that the collection agent and his

159. Id. at 188-90, 469 S.E.2d at 224-25.
160. Id. at 191-92, 456 S.E.2d at 226.
161. 215 Ga. App. 456, 452 S.E.2d 208 (1994).
162. 215 Ga. App. at 462, 452 S.E.2d at 213-14. Although the creditor contended that
it was not liable for a breach of the peace by the independent contractor it hired to
repossess the automobile, the court found that it would be against public policy to insulate
the creditor, as an employer of an independent contractor. "The general rule that an
employer is not ordinarily liable for tortious acts committed by an independent contractor
has important exceptions ....
[For example,] public policy forbids such a waiver or release
when the duty imposed is on in which the public has an interest." Id., 452 S.E.2d at 214
(internal quotation omitted). In light of this, the court refused to relieve "a repossessing
creditor of liability simply because the creditor employs an independent contractor to carry
out the task of repossession." Id. Thus, although the acts of repossession were actually
performed by agents of the independent contractor, these acts were imputed to the creditor.
163. Id. at 458-59, 452 S.E.2d at 211-12.
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helpers were polite, unabusive, and refrained from profane language, the
court judged these circumstances to be sufficient to support plaintiff's
breach of the peace claim.'
Further, plaintiff's consent to repossession was not a defense under
these circumstances.' For the debtor's consent to constitute a defense
against a claim for wrongful repossession, the consent must be voluntary. The court found that consent induced by a law enforcement official
is not voluntary.'
3.
Disposition of Collateral and Deficiency Judgments. Assuming that a creditor has properly declared default, he may
retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, or dispose of it in a
commercially reasonable manner and thereafter seek a deficiency
judgment against the debtor. Should the creditor elect to retain the
collateral, he must provide written notice to the debtor of his intention
to do so unless the debtor signs a statement after default renouncing or
modifying the rights provided in O.C.G.A. section 11-9-505(2)." 7 The
section 505 notice requirement permits a debtor to mitigate his loss by
affording him the opportunity to exercise any right of redemption or by
insisting on "liquidation in a commercially reasonable manner as
required by O.C.G.A. section 11-9-504,"'" and also insulates the
creditor from claims that the collateral should have been sold in a
commercially reasonable manner. If a creditor retains the collateral in
satisfaction of the debt without providing section 505 notice or securing
a signed waiver by the debtor, the creditor will be subject to an action
by the debtor for damages, under either a conversion theory or pursuant
to O.C.G.A. section 11-9-507(1).'"6

At issue in Chen v. Profit Sharing Plan was the sufficiency of the
section 505 notice provided the debtor. After default, the creditor sent
the debtor the following letter:
"[D]ue to [your] default, [creditor] claims all rights pursuant to various
transfer agreements of promissory note and deed to secure debt from
you to [creditor] which [creditor] already holds an interest. Such note
and security deed originally executed by Frances F. Blankenship dated
August 29, 1986 shall be subject to private sale at any time after

164. Id. at 461, 452 S.E.2d at 213.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing 9A RONALD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503:21 at
280-81 (3d ed. 1994)).
167. Chen v. Profit Sharing Plan, 216 Ga. App. 878, 880, 456 S.E.2d 237, 240 (1995).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 882, 456 S.E.2d at 241.
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August 20, 1990, which date is ten days subsequent to your presumed
receipt of this letter allowing reasonable time for delivery of same.1 70
In addition, an addendum to the documents creating the security
interest stated that if debtor failed to make payments "the assignment
of the collateral shall stand and no furtherduty shall be held between the
parties."'
Because the section 505 notice must "clearly state the creditor's
proposal to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt and must
notify the debtor that he has 21 days to raise an objection to such a
proposal," the court found that the creditor's above-quoted letter was
insufficient. 1 72 Moreover, the language of the addendum was nothing
173
more than an ineffective attempt at a predefault waiver of rights.
The debtor was therefore entitled to assert a cause of action for
conversion
or for damages as set forth in O.C.G.A. section 11-9174
507(1).
However, only rarely will a creditor desire to retain the collateral.
Creditors are generally not in the business of the debtor and would
rather convert the collateral to cash and collect any deficiency from the
debtor. When a creditor is undersecured, disposition is the only
alternative because retention of the collateral precludes pursuit of a
deficiency judgment.
If a creditor wishes to seek a deficiency judgment, the collateral must
be disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner. The court in
Strong v. Wachovia Bank of Georgia, NA.175 set forth this rule as
follows:
Where the commercial reasonableness of a sale is challenged by the
debtor, the party holding the security interest has the burden of
proving that the terms of the sale were commercially reasonable and
that the resale price was the fair and reasonable value of the collateral.
The secured party must also prove [1] the value of the collateral at the
time of repossession and [2] that the value of the goods does not equal
the value of the debt .... Further, even if the sale is conducted in a
commercially reasonable manner, proof of the sale price is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption against [the creditor] that the
value of the collateral equals the debt on it. 76

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 879, 456 S.E.2d at 239-40.
Id., 456 S.E.2d at 239 (emphasis added).
Id. at 880-81, 456 S.E.2d at 240-41.
Id., 456 S.E.2d at 240.
Id. at 882, 456 S.E.2d at 241.
215 Ga. App. 572, 451 S.E.2d 524 (1994).
Id. at 574, 451 S.E.2d at 527 (internal quotation omitted and emphasis added).

COMMERCIAL LAW

1996]

In Strong, debtor defaulted on a loan for which a cabin cruiser boat
served as collateral. After repossession of the boat, creditor provided
debtor with the requisite notice of its intent to dispose of the boat at a
private sale. After the sale, creditor sought a deficiency in excess of
$20,000. A jury awarded creditor $12,500.117
Debtor challenged the jury's verdict, arguing that creditor had failed
to establish the value of the boat "at the time of repossession."17 The
court of appeals rejected debtor's argument, however, finding the
following evidence was sufficient to prove the boat's value when creditor
repossessed it. 17

An owner of a boat brokerage company testified

without objection as to the value upon repossession and further
answered hypothetical valuation scenarios that were dependent upon the
boat's condition, whether repaired or improved. Another witness, an
employee of creditor who had handled repossessions and foreclosures,
gave an opinion to the boat's "book value" based on his review of
industry guides.'80 This evidence was sufficient, notwithstanding that
the owner of the boat brokerage company did not have personal
knowledge of the boat's condition upon repossession, and creditor's
employee never observed the boat personally. 8 '
Although Strong suggests that creditors are not required to conduct an
appraisal as soon as possible after repossession, it would still be wise to
do so. It must be remembered that the court in Strong was reviewing
the jury's verdict under the any evidence standard: if any evidence
exists to support the jury's verdict, it will not be disturbed. 82 In light
of this standard of review, the court of appeals endorsement of the
foregoing as sufficient evidence is not as powerful as it would seem to be.
The evidence was merely sufficient to defeat debtor's motion for directed
verdict. A jury would certainly have been more impressed with the
evidence of value had it heard from someone who, very soon after
repossession, personally inspected the boat. The trouble of arranging for
an appraisal soon after repossession would more than likely pay for itself
in the form of the jury's verdict.
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Id. at 572, 451 S.E.2d at 526.
Id. at 573-75, 451 S.E.2d at 527.
Id. at 573-74, 451 S.E.2d at 527.
Id. at 574, 451 S.E.2d at 527.
Id. at 574-75, 451 S.E.2d at 527.
Id. at 573, 451 S.E.2d at 527.

